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Abstract
This article focuses on the precarious generation protesting in Spain and Italy
in times of crisis and austerity (2010-2012). Their many similarities notwith-
standing, the two countries have experienced different types of mobilization
against austerity measures. In Spain, a relatively autonomous mobiliza -
tion –characterized by new collective actors and new forms of action– has
made possible the building of a political actor, Podemos, able to seriously
challenge the established political parties. In Italy, instead, the mobilization
was dominated by established political actors, especially trade unions, did not
produce innovative forms of action and has not been able to overcome (so far)
the fragmentation of the social movement sector. In both countries, however,
the anti-austerity protests have been characterized by a strong presence of
what we call hear the “precarious generation”, particularly exposed to the
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economic crisis and the austerity measures. By relying on data from several
surveys conducted in demonstrations on social, economic and labor issues in
the two countries from 2010 to 2011, in this article we single out differences
and the similarities in terms of presence, social composition, grievances and
emotion, collective identity and network embeddedness of the precarious
generation. Our findings show that the precarious generation was almost
equally present in the selected demonstrations in the two countries, share simi -
lar socio-graphic features and similar types of grievance and emotions.
Nonetheless, in Spain it seems to have built a more cohesive and radical co -
llective identity based upon a more informal and internet based network inte-
gration while in Italy it seems embedded in a more traditional and formal
network, which prevented the formation of a strong collective identity. More -
over, while in Spain the differences between the older and the precarious
generation reveal that, both have a strong identity based on different net-
works; more formal the older and more related to informal and online instru-
ments the latter; in Italy, the older generation has a much stronger collective
identity based on a organizational network, while the precarious one is less
but still integrated in organizational network. We conclude that the more
autonomous civil society tradition in Spain, together with the particular politi -
cal opportunities, under the pressure of a harsher economic crisis, may account
for the differences we found. 
Keywords: Precarious generation; contentious; anti-austerity; movements;
Italy; Spain. 
Resumen
Este artículo se centra en la protesta de la generación precaria en España e
Italia en tiempos de crisis y austeridad (2010-2012). A pesar de sus muchas
similitudes, los dos países han experimentado diferentes tipos de movilización
contra las medidas de austeridad. En España, una movilización relativamente
autónoma –caracterizada por nuevos actores colectivos y nuevas formas de
acción– ha hecho posible la construcción de un actor político, Podemos, capaz
de desafiar seriamente a los partidos políticos establecidos. En Italia, en cam-
bio, la movilización fue dominada por los actores políticos establecidos, espe-
cialmente los sindicatos, no produjo formas innovadoras de acción y no ha sido
capaz de superar (hasta ahora) la fragmentación de los movimientos sociales.
En ambos países, sin embargo, las protestas contra la austeridad se han carac-
terizado por una fuerte presencia de lo que se ha denominado "generación
precaria", particularmente expuesta a la crisis económica y las medidas de
austeridad. Basándonos en datos de varias encuestas realizadas en protestas
sobre cuestiones sociales, económicas y laborales en los dos países de 2010 a
2011, en este artículo destacamos las diferencias y las similitudes de la gene -
ración precaria en términos de presencia, composición social, sentimientos de
agravio y emoción, identidad colectiva e integración en las redes. Nuestros re -
sultados muestran que la generación precaria tenía casi la misma presencia en
las protestas seleccionadas en los dos países, compartían características socio-
demográficas similares y el mismo tipo de agravios y emociones. Sin embargo,
en España, parece haberse construido una identidad colectiva más coherente
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y radical, integrada a partir de unas redes informales y basadas en Internet;
mientras que en Italia aparece arraigada a partir de redes más tradicionales y for-
males, lo que impide la formación de una identidad colectiva fuerte. Por otra
parte, mientras que en España las diferencias entre la generación más mayor
y la generación precaria revelan que ambas tienen una fuerte identidad en
base a las diferentes redes que las sustentan (más formal en la mayor y más
relacionada con instrumentos informales y online en la última); en Italia, la
generación más mayor tiene una identidad colectiva mucho más fuerte sobre
la base de una red organizativa, mientras que en la generación precaria ésta
es menor, pero todavía integrada en una red organizativa. Llegamos a la con-
clusión de que una tradición más autónoma de la sociedad civil en España,
junto con las oportunidades políticas particulares, bajo la presión de una cri-
sis económica más severa, pueden dar cuenta de las diferencias encontradas.
Palabras clave: generación precaria, protesta, antiausteridad, movimientos,
Italia, España.
On May 15th 2011, indignant citizens started permanent occupation of Puerta
del Sol in Madrid, building tent city for hundreds of people, but also other infra-
structures for tens of thousands of visitors. In the following days, the mobilization
quickly spread to hundreds of Spanish cities, all around the country. In fact, “the
encampments rapidly evolved into ‘cities within cities’ governed through popular
assemblies and committees. The committees were created around practical needs
such as cooking, cleaning, communicating and carrying out actions. Decisions were
made through both majority rules vote and consensus. The structure was horizon-
tal, with rotating spokespersons in lieu of leaders. Tens of thousands of citizens were
thus experimenting with participatory, direct and inclusive forms of democracy at
odds with the dominant logic of political representation. Displaying a thorough
mixture of utopianism and pragmatism, the new movement drew up a list of con-
crete demands, including the removal of corrupt politicians from electoral lists, while
pursuing revolutionary goals such as giving ‘All power to the People” (Postill, 2011).
On October 15th 2011, fallowing a call for a transnational day of action by
the Spanish Indignados, a march was organized in Rome. Participation was huge:
300 000 people according to many sources. However, only a few of these managed to
arrive in Piazza San Giovanni because violent clashes between some groups of de -
monstrators dressed in black and the police disrupted the demonstration and made
its conclusion impossible. The first violent incidents happened in Via Cavour
between 2.30pm and 3pm: some groups of people dressed in black (between 100 and
200) attacked cars, cash machines and supermarkets, while other demonstrators
tried to stop them. Between 3 and 4pm, between the Coliseum and Via Labicana,
a few hundred militarised demonstrators in black outfits started attacking different
targets, including a semi-abandoned office of the Ministry of Defence. The police
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confronted them, and the clashes continued to Piazza San Giovanni, where some
of the demonstrators, who had already arrived, fled, while others joined the struggle
against the police. The violence extended resulted in 135 injured and much frus-
tration among the activists, who had seen a large mobilization which had failed in
its political development (della Porta and Zamponi, 2013). 
1. ANTI-AUSTERITY PROTESTS IN SPAIN AND ITALY: 
AN INTRODUCTION
While anti-austerity protests in the years 2000s were important in both coun-
tries, they took different characteristics. The two mentioned episodes are
emblematic of such differences. In Spain, in fact, new forms of protests mobi-
lized masses of those who had been directly affected by austerity policies. While
previously existing networks –built around the anti-Bologna process protests
organized by the students, the struggle against evictions, the platform of young
people against precariousness– clearly played a role in the development of the
protests, the camps that spread from Madrid to all over Spain were able to mobi-
lize a large number of first time protesters, with massive experimentations with
participatory and deliberative forms of democracy in the squares (Romanos,
2011). Even when the police evicted the activists from the squares, protest
continued indeed in neighbourhoods as well as around public services and
common goods. The stunning growth of Podemos, as a party related with the
indignadosmovement, testifies of the long-term effects of a cycle of contention
that involved a large part of the Spanish population.
In Italy, instead, while strikes and regular rallies dominated contentious
politics, with unions and social movement organizations as main collective
actors (della Porta, Mosca and Parks, 2015; della Porta and Reiter, 2012; della
Porta and Andretta 2013), the innovative forms of action did not spread.
Indeed, when the global day of action for October 15th was organized globe-
wide, in Italy, no broad movement had emerged in direct imitation of the 15M
in Spain. The self-proclaimed «Italian indignados» camping in Piazza San Gio -
vanni in Rome were only a few in number and not recognised by other social
and political actors. An important role in anti-austerity protests had been assu -
med in the last three years by the student movement, which however in the
Spring of 2011 had been weakened by a clear defeat on the education reform.
Therefore, the organisation of the Italian mobilisation of October 15th became
a contentious issue among Italian social movements, with different political
groups trying to gain symbolic strength and visibility as the organisers of the
protest. In particular, the tensions in the social movements’ organizational field
were built around some main cleavages between the global justice generation
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and an emerging anti-austerity generation; as well as between different move-
ment coalitions that had grown around the mobilisation of the preceding three
years, especially involving students, steelworkers and grassroots environmen-
tal committees. Around these cleavages, a complex web of misunderstandings,
tensions and internal struggles developed during the whole summer, jeopardi -
zing attempts at building formal or informal structures of organisation towards
October 15th (della Porta and Zamponi, 2013). Afterwards, while protests con-
tinued in different forms, attempt to give them an electoral outcome got very
limited results.
The different developments in the recent years are embedded in, if not de -
termined by, different protest cultures that dominated in the two countries.
While of course the more rapid and dramatic impact of the financial crisis in
Spain versus Italy can in part account for the more dramatic expression of dis-
content in the former than in the latter, protest repertoires appeared as influen -
ced by different historical experiences. As research about the evolution of the
Global Justice Movement (GJM) in the two countries had already indicated,
strong in both countries, the transnational protests of the beginning of the years
2000s took different characteristics in the two countries. In Spain, decentrali -
zed and grassroots tendencies dominated, resonating with libertarian traditions
as well as with the mobilization of ethnic and national territorial minorities.
In Italy, the three main nodes present in the global justice movement –the
ecopacifists, the anti-neoliberals and the (inheritor of the) Disobedients– had
interacted in the local social forums that flowered before and after the anti-G8
protest in Genoa. Even after the demise of most of them, occasions for collabo -
ration have been frequent (Andretta, 2005; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and
Reiter, 2006; della Porta, 2007). In Italy, however the traditional political ten-
sions among different social movements sectors emerged again in the declining
phase of the GJM (Andretta and Piazza, 2010) and remained visible in the years
to follow. Especially, as the center-right Berlusconi government was substituted
by a grand-coalition in support of the self-defined “technical” government led
by Mario Monti, the implementation of anti-austerity measures found week
opposition by unions and associations that had traditionally developed near to
the center-left parties. 
As the GJM dynamics in the two countries before, the recent waves of anti-
austerity protests seem also to have been fuelled and constrained by the social
movement traditions present in the two countries, which also reflect the his-
torical production of two different types of civil society.
Those historical experiences produced a very different kind of civil socie-
ty in the two countries, also as a result of the different timing and types of tran-
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sition toward democracy. In an interesting comparison between the types of
civil societies emerged and consolidated during and after the democratization
process in the two countries, Riley and Fernandez found a stronger but less
autonomous civil society in Italy: “In the current democratic period, civil socie -
ty is organizationally stronger in Italy than in Spain. Italians are more likely
than Spaniards to join voluntary associations, there are more cooperatives per
capita in Italy than in Spain, higher percentages of Italians than Spaniards are
members of unions, and Italians join parties and vote in greater numbers than
their Spanish counterparts. Further, Italians are more likely to petition their
government than Spaniards, and Italy has experienced more general strikes and
riots in its postdictatorial democracy than Spain” (2014: 453). At the same time,
the authors found that the two civil societies differ also in terms of linkage with
political parties, more heteronomous in Italy and more autonomous in Spain.
This seems particularly true for the relations between trade unions and politi-
cal parties (ibid.: 454-459). Indeed, the traditional reliance on left-wing par-
ties, that had turned to the center, might have contributed to weakened con-
tentious capacity in Italy than in Spain, especially after the Partito Democratico
(PD) started to support or participate in governments that were perceived to
implement the neoliberal agenda. 
While the differences in the types of organizations involved in the two wa -
ves of anti-austerity protests easily fits such an interpretation, we should also
consider the earlier and higher exposition to the economic crisis and the rela -
ted harsher austerity measures, which in turn could have produced more grie -
vance in Spain than in Italy among the most exposed sectors of the popula-
tion, especially among what we call “precarious generation”. In fact, as for past
critical junctures, “social change may affect the characteristics of social conflict
and collective action in different ways. It may facilitate the emergence of social
groups with a specific structural location and potential specific interests” (della
Porta and Diani, 2006: 35).
These differences accounted for, we also expect cross-national similarities
in the ways in which the precarious generation (defined as made of those
between 14 and 40 years old) mobilizes. This generation faces indeed a very di -
fferent type of life expectations and/or conditions than the previous ones, and
it is more seriously threatened by the current economic crisis. This makes
particularly interesting to investigate how these citizens overcome barriers of
mar ginalization, network and develop collective identities. Our precarious gene -
ration is, like Guy Standing’s precariat, composed of people ‘who have minimal
trust relations with capitalism or the state, making it quite different from the
salariat. And it has none of the social contract relationship of the proletariat,
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whereby labour securities were provided in exchange for subordination and
contingent loyalty, the unwritten deal underpinning welfare state’ (Standing,
2011: 9). It is in fact characterized by a sum of insecurity on the labour market,
on the job (as regulations on hiring and dismissals give little protection to
workers), on the work (with weak provisions for accident and illness), on in -
come (with very low pay), all these conditions having effects in terms of accu-
mulation of anger, anomie, anxiety and alienation (ibid: 10 ff.). As he noted,
precariat “is not just a matter of having insecure employment, of being in jobs
of limited duration and with minimal labour protection (…) it is being in a
status that offers no sense of career, no sense of secure occupational identity and
few, if any, entitlements to the state and enterprise benefits that several gene -
rations of those who found themselves as belonging to the industrial proleta -
riat or the salariat had come to expect as their due” (ibid.: 24).
By precarious generation, we refer to a life cohort for which precarity, as
Standing defines it, become a most widespread condition. The extent to which
the precarious generation is a class very much depends, in Marxian terms, on
the extent to which it is aware of the common class interests and engages in
collective action (Andrew, 1983). This is rather an empirical question that we try
to investigate here.
By relying on data of several surveys conducted in demonstrations on social,
economic and labor issues in the two countries from 2010 to 2011, in this arti-
cle we investigate the differences and the similarities in terms of presence, social
composition, grievances and emotion, collective identity and network em -
beddedness of the precarious generation. The article is structured as following:
in the following section (2), we present the research method and the logic
guiding the selection of the demonstrations surveyed; section 3, 4, 5, and 6,
introduced by a literature review on the dimensions we decided to focus on, deal
respectively with the presence and the social composition of the precarious
generation; its type of grievances and emotions; its collective identity; and, fina -
lly, its network embeddedness. In each dimension we also compare older and
precarious generations within countries. In the conclusions, we will summarize
the most important findings and suggest some tentative explanations. 
2. THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
In addressing the above-mentioned questions, we will use data on surveys of
pro test demonstrations in Italy carried out by Cosmos (Centre on Social Move -
ment Studies) at the European University Institute within an international con-
sortium coordinated by Bert Klandermans and Stefaan Walgrave on a project
named Contextualizing Contestation. The surveys were carried out mainly
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between 2010 and 2013, in the years of hardest recession. They covered dozens
of demonstrations in countries most hit by the crisis, such as Spain and Italy,
and those which seemed instead less hard hit, such as the Netherlands, Belgium,
Switzerland and Sweden, with Czech Republic and the U.K. in between (see
www.protestsurvey.eu). We here focus only on Spain and Italy.
In each country, different types of demonstrations were selected, involving
both old and new social movements. For this article, we restricted the analy-
sis to four type of demonstrations in both Spain and Italy: the traditional first
may (one held in Barcelona in 2010 and one in Florence, 2011), a typical anti-
austerity protest (one in Rome in 2012 and one in Vigo 2011); an anti-neoli be -
ral type of protest (one in Barcelona in 2010 and one in Florence in 2012) and,
finally, a new type of protest involving directly the precarious generation (the
EuroMayday in Milan in 2011 and the Real Democracy Demonstration in Bar -
celona in the same year). We tried to maximize in this way the similarities across
the compared demonstrations. Demonstrators were sampled randomly and
given a questionnaire to mail back. About 1,000 questionnaires were dinstri bu -
ted at each demonstration, with an average return rate of 20 per cent for the
Italian case. In order to reduce selection bias arising from the tendency of inter-
viewers to select some categories of interviewee rather than others, ‘pointers’
were asked to assign randomly selected demonstrators to the interviewers
(van Stekelenburg, Walgrave, Klandermans, and Verhulst, 2012; Andretta and
della Porta, 2014). The core questionnaire included questions about socio-
demographic variables; mobilization channels and techniques; social embedded -
ness; instrumental, identity and ideological motives; emotions; conventional
and unconventional political behaviour; political attitudes (including politi-
cal interest, left-right self-placement, political cynicism); and awareness of
and identification with protestors elsewhere in the world. A short face-to-face
questionnaire was also filled in during the demonstration and used to control
for return bias. Interviewers were instructed to administer such short ques-
tionnaires to every five people selected. This allowed us to control for possi-
ble bias introduced in the return of the questionnaires. The variables included
in the short face-to-face questionnaires that can be compared with those in the
longer postal questionnaires are: gender, education, age, membership in organi -
zations staging the demonstration, participation in past demonstrations, and
the extent to which interviewers were determined to participate in the selected
demonstrations. Our bias analysis demonstrated that on only two variables (gen -
der and participation in previous demonstrations in the last twelve months)
and only in some of the demonstrations there were weak statistically significant
differences between the two samples.
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For each demonstration, we also filled in fact sheets in order to assess con-
text variations, which included short interviews with both organizers and police
(before and after the demonstrations) as well as an analysis of media coverage
of the events. Moreover, the interviewers were asked to complete another short
survey reporting on such characteristics of the demonstration as number of par-
ticipants, slogans, weather conditions, and so on, as well as specific questions
about responses to the survey. 
Using the surveys conducted in the selected Italian and Spanish demons -
trations, this article focuses on the analysis of what we call “precarious gene -
ration” involved in them. The term “generation” implies an operationalization
based on age. We decided to consider as members of the precarious generation
those demonstrators born after 1970. This means that they were 42 years old or
less at the moment of the selected demonstrations. 
3. PRESENCE AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PRECARIOUS 
GENERATION IN ITALY AND SPAIN
Research on political participation has long suggested that political partici-
pation increases with social centrality. The first research on political participa-
tion, based upon surveys, revealed very low levels of participation (La groye,
1993: 312). Moreover, the number of citizens involved diminished dramatical-
ly for the more demanding forms of participation. The normative pro blems
involved in this selectivity were increased by the non-representativity of those
who participated: in fact, higher levels of participation were observed, ceteris
paribus, for the better educated, middle class, men, middle-age cohort, mar-
ried people, city residents, ethnic majority, and citizens involved in voluntary
associations (Milbrath and Goel, 1977). In a similar way, in their research on
participation in the US, Verba and Nie (1972) observed that the higher the
social status of an individual, the higher the probability that s/he will partici -
pate; and this observation has been confirmed in a seven-nation comparison
(Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978) that concluded that social inequalities are reflected
in unequal political influence. Usually, higher social status implies in fact more
material resources (but also free-time) to invest in political participation, as well
as a higher probability of being successful in their careers (via personal rela-
tionships with powerful individuals) and especially a higher sense of personal
achievement. Psychological disadvantages overlap with social disadvantages,
reducing the perception of one’s own “droit de parole” (Bourdieu, 1979: 180). If
participation responds to demands for equality, it tends however to reproduce
inequalities since “any individual participates, at least potentially, with the di -
fferential (or unequal) coefficient (if we do not want to use the word ‘privilege’,
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that would have an ancien régime flavour) that characterizes his/her position
in the system of private interests” (Pizzorno, 1966: 90).
Social movement studies have challenged this elitist vision by presenting
protest as a resource of the powerless (Lipsky, 1970). They noted indeed that
those who protest present some different characteristics than those who use
con ventional forms of political participation: if the middle classes do vote more,
workers strike more often; and if those in middle age are more present in par -
ty-related activities, students occupy their schools and universities (della Porta,
2015). Nevertheless, social movement studies also recognized that protesting
requires some biographical availability (McAdam, 1986, 1989). First of all, time
availability and responsibilities are considered as relevant. Initially, there was
indeed an expectation that growing older (getting a job, marrying, having chil-
dren) implied less flexibility in the use of one’s own time as well as increasing
responsibility which makes protest less likely: it would be more costly and
potentially risky for those middle-age persons than, for instance, for young stu-
dents. Also, there was an expectation that some material resources could help
in buying some time flexibility. While research indicated however an effect of
protesting on those socio-biographical conditions –delaying the formation of
family or pushing towards some types of work rather than others– it could not
definitively confirm that the taking up of work and family responsibility reduces
the commitment to protest. While indeed married life tends to reduce the level
of commitment (Corrigall-Brown, 2011), having a full-time job increases par-
ticipation in voluntary organizations, and even in high-risk forms of partici-
pation (Nepstad and Smith, 1999; Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991; Passy and
Giugni, 2001). In particular, growing older, getting a job and building a family
do not necessarily reduce participation in protest. Recent research noted how-
ever that some conditions which affect biographical availability can impact
on the step which precedes actual choices to participate: the development of
positive motivations towards protest seems to decline for married people and
full-time or part-time employees (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006). According to
Verhulst and Walgrave (2009), first-timers are indeed more often young, but
pro fession does not play a role.
Our research indicates that both in Spain and in Italy the presence of a pre-
carious generation, made of people born after 1970, in many types of demons -
trations occurred in the period of crisis, is very strong. The precarious genera -
tion in all the demonstrations selected is slightly more present in Spain (50.5%)
than in Italy (44.8%). If we look at its presence across the types of demonstra-
tions (table 1), we see that while in Italy the precarious generation concentra -
ted in what we called “Youth against the crisis” type (80.5% vs. 60.5% in Spain),
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in Spain it participated more also in the other types: if in the “anti-neoliberal”
type it was almost equally present in the two countries (about 53% in Italy and
about 57% in Spain), the Spanish precarious generation constituted about 46%
of the “anti-austerity” demonstrators (against 35% in Italy), and as much as 32%
in the traditional “May First Day”, against only 10% in Italy. 
What is more, only 7% in Italy and 12% in Spain are “first timer”; while
more than half participated more than 1 and less than 5 demonstrations before.
Besides demonstrating, the two precarious generations show a high degree of
commitment in various types of protest actions (Fig. 1).
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Tab. 1. Presence of Precarious Generation in Italy and
Spain across types of demonstrations2
Types of protests
Youth against
Traditional anti- the crisis and
COUNTRY May day anti-austerity neoliberal for democracy
Italy               Older 95 122 62 24 303
Generation 90,5% 64,2% 47,3% 19,5% 55,2%
Precarious 10 68 69 99 246
Generation 9,5% 35,8% 52,7% 80,5% 44,8%
Total 105 190 131 123 549
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Spain             Older 120 90 33 135 378
Generation 68,2% 53,9% 43,4% 39,2% 49,5%
Precarious 56 77 43 209 385
Generation 31,8% 46,1% 56,6% 60,8% 50,5%
Total 176 167 76 344 763
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
It is worth noticing that no much difference can be seen on the basic socio-gra -
phic features of the two protesting precarious generations: in countries about
50% is woman, In Spain 20% was born after 1986, and 25% In Italy; about 50%
in both countries was born between 1977 and 1986; 70% in Spain and 80% in
Italy has at least a tertiary first stage level of formal education; 51% in Spain
and 63% in Italy has actually an unstable job position, either student (about 25%
in both countries), or unemployed, or part-time employed, or individually self-
employed. It is to be mentioned that the precarious generation involved in
the two May First demonstrations selected differ a bit, though for the Italian
case the number of participants belonging to this category is too small (just 10)
to generalize: in the first may in fact demonstrators of the precarious genera-
tion is much more male than the average in the other demonstrations selected
(60% in Italy and 64% in Spain), only one participant in Italy and about 20%
in Spain was born after 1986, and 50% in Italy but only 40% in Spain between
1977 and 1986; and only 35% in Spain, but 70% in Italy, has actually an unsta-
ble job position. While no relevant differences have been found in terms of for-
mal education. 
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Figure 1. Precarious generation participation in type of 
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It is also interesting that both precarious generations differs from older genera -
tions. In Spain, the older generation is prevalently male (63%), less formally edu -
cated (16% completed only the basic level of education, against 5% of the preca -
rious generation; and 35% against 60% completed the second stage of tertiary
or more); has a stable job position (81% against 41%, either with a full time job,
62%, or with a pension, 18%). In Italy, the older generation gender is more equi -
librated than in Spain (53% of males); but 42% against only 15% of the young
completed only the secondary level of formal education; and 83% against 37%
has a stable job position (54% has a full time job and 28% is retired).
In sum, in both countries, more or less the same type of precarious gene -
ration mobilized in the demonstrations selected, and in both countries their
substantially differ from older generations in terms of socio-graphic features.
Their mainly unstable job position did not prevent their active participation in
demonstrations. It seems that, under the pressure of a serious threat, such as
the crisis and the austerity policies, which is seriously challenging their present
life and future expectations, their biographical availability helped them to take
the “street” in protest. 
4. GRIEVANCES AND EMOTIONS IN THE PRECARIOUS GENERATION
Grievances theories have long been challenged by more recent approaches
to social movement studies (Klandermans, 1997), suggesting that what is to be
analysed is more how grievances are translated into actions than grievances
per se. If this is certainly a good point, it does not allow however for a complete
dismissing of the grievances analysis. As van Stekelemburg and Klanedermans
(2010: 2) have recently argued, “At the heart of every protest are grievances,
be it the experience of illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation,
feelings of injustice, moral indignation about some state of affairs, or a sudden-
ly imposed grievance”. If it is true that grievances do not produce automati-
cally protest, the current economic crisis and the spread of protest in many
countries, has brought about a renewed attention of the structural socio-eco-
nomic transformations producing different grievances and collective action
(della Porta, 2015). Social psychologists, are among the few who continued to
pay attention to grievances theories, by underlining how together with other
dimensions, the relations between grievances and emotions is worth analyzing
to explain collective action: the sense of injustice often produces indignation
which in turn is transformed in anger (Klandermans, Van der Toorn and Van
Stekelenburg, 2008). 
While research on social movements initially shied away from emotions
and stressed the ordinariness of the people who participate in movements, more
recently there has been a recognition that social movement politics is passiona -
te politics (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001), as “participants in rituals com-
municate whole complexes of ideas and embodied feelings” (Barker, 2001: 188).
Social movements are certainly rich in emotions: “Anger, fear, envy, guilt, pity,
shame, awe, passion, and other feelings play a part either in the formation of
social movements, in their relations with their targets… and in the life of
potential recruits and members” (Kemper, 2001, p. 58). Emotions often men-
tioned in relation with social movements include grief, anger, joy, pride, love,
and indignation (Gould, 2003).
Contentious precarious generation in anti-austerity movements in Spain an Italy 49
OBETS. Revista de Ciencias Sociales. Vol. 10, n.º 1, 2015, pp. 37-66. DOI: 10.14198/OBETS2015.10.1.02
Different typologies have been built that distinguish emotions that address
a specific object from more generic one, or short-term versus long term emo-
tions, or reciprocal versus shared emotions (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta,
2001). Emotions of trauma (grief, shame, helpless anger) are distinguished from
emotions of resistance (pride, happiness, love, safety, confidence, righteous an -
ger) in research on the movement against child sexual abuse (Whittier, 2001:
239). Feelings such as anger, outrage or fear can be particularly relevant in re -
cruitment; indignation, pleasure, and pride can reinforce commitment (Good -
win, Jasper and Polletta, 2001). 
Emotions are embedded in context, where social rules define the proper
emo tions to feel and the proper way to express them (Goodwin, Jasper and
Polletta, 2001). In fact, emotions are produced in social interactions: rituals
produce emotions, and emotions interact with cognition in determining an in -
dividual’s behaviour. In authoritarian regimes as well as in democracies, public
rituals are staged in order to produce communities of feeling (Berezin, 2001).
Social movements as well as movement events tend to transform emotions
(e.g. transforming shame into solidarity), or to intensify them (Collins, 2001:
29). Successful rituals produce collective effervescence and group solidarity,
strengthening the emotional energy. For example, some protest rituals and lan-
guage helped transform shame into pride in the gay and lesbian communities
(Gould 2001). In particular, social movements transform emotions by modi-
fying the everyday relations the “old” emotions were attached to (Calhoun,
2001: 55). Specific groups or specific environments nurture master emotional
paradigms (or habitus) that define appropriate emotions (della Porta and Giug -
ni, 2009). 
In order to investigate the grievances, we focus on the protestors attitudes
toward the political system and main political actors, as well as on their satis-
faction with the democracy in their country. Trust is generally very low, sho wing
similarities in the political grievance of the two precarious generations: natio -
nal governments, the parliaments and political parties receive a very low level of
trust, while trade unions, the judicial system and the European Union are
trusted slightly more (Figure 2). It is worth noticing that in Italy the judicial sys-
tem and the European Union are trusted much more than in Spain by the pre-
carious generation: about 40% in Italy but only 12% in Spain trust the former,
and about 26% against only 9% the latter. A possible explanation may be the
different political contexts, in Italy the “hated” Berlusconi government has been
several time challenged by judicial investigation and the EU has been per-
ceived as a potential ally against the national government; while in Spain the
hardship of the austerity measures have made more evident the role of the EU
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in supporting and even dictating those measures. Satisfaction with democracy
is very low in both countries. The precarious generations seem to believe that
the anti-austerity measures could not have been passed if democracy had worked
in their country: on a scale from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very much satis -
fied), participants answers in the two countries score only about 2.4 
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Fig. 2. Precarious generation’s (quite and very much) trust on 
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If we look at the differences within the countries between precarious and older
generations, in Italy, the latter trust a bit more, but still very little, political insti-
tutions: 3.4% vs. 1.6% the national government; 6.2% vs. 3.7% the parliament;
7.8% vs. 3.3% political parties; 29% vs. 17% trade unions (here the difference is
statistically significant at .001 level; Cr.s V: .13); 46% against 40% the judicial
system; and 28% against 26% the EU. Dissatisfaction with democracy is at the
same level. In Spain, instead, with the exception of the judicial system and the
EU, distrusted at the same level by both the generations; all other institutions
and actors are trusted significantly more by the older generation: the national
government, 13% against 6% (Cr.s V: .11, at .01 level); the parliament, 14%
against 6% (.13, at .001 level); political parties, 10% vs. 4% (.12, at .001 level);
and trade unions, 28% against 16% (.14, at .001 level). In the 0-10 scale of
democracy satisfaction, while the precarious generation stops at 2.4, the older
one reaches 3.4 (ETA: .22, significant at .001 level).
Dissatisfaction with democracy calls into question also the role of political
parties, which receive a very low trust, and only 20% of the precarious gene -
ration in both countries feel very close to a particular political party. The atti-
tude towards elections differs very much in the two countries. If the majority
of both generations (more than 50%) disagree with the sentence “Vote is use-
less in this country”; only 1% in Italy but as much as 82% in Spain did not vote
in the last elections before the demonstration. In Italy, in fact, the precarious
generation grievances seem to be much more channelized by existing extreme
leftist parties (about 58% voted for a communist party there) than in Spain (only
3%). No much differences we found on this electoral aspect between precarious
and older generations within countries (though in Spain 76% instead of 82%
voted no party). 
As far as emotions are considered, our questionnaire included a battery of
four items, which sought to measure the emotional side of demonstrators’ mobi-
lization. Respondents were asked to express how angry, worried, frustrated or
fearful they felt when they thought of the problems they were protesting about
using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). In Figure 3 we illustrated
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Figure 3. Strong emotions of the precarious generation in Italy and Spain5











the percentage of those feeling “very strongly”: most demonstrators of the pre-
carious generation strongly feel angry, worried and, a bit less than 50%, frus-
trated (while only 25% fearful), while the Italians seem a bit more worried and
fearful than Spaniards. 
In Spain, not much differences concerning emotions emerge between the
precarious and the older generation; while, in Italy, interestingly, the older one
is angrier (70% vs. 56%; Cr.s V: .15, at .001 level), but less fearful (18% vs.
26%) and frustrated (40% vs. 46%).
Other indicators, often associated with emotions are the individual’s and
the group’s sense of efficacy. Here too, no relevant differences are associated with
the two protesting precarious generations, who present, in both countries, a
high feeling of effectiveness: 62% in Spain and 70% in Italy agree or strongly
agree with the item “My participation can have an impact on public policy in
this country”; and as much as 81% in Italy and 85% in Spain with the item
“Organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies”. Also
the older generations in the two countries share the same feeling of effective-
ness.
To sum up, the precarious generation in Spain and Italy does not signifi-
cantly differ in terms of “indignation” toward the political system, probably
considered unable to deal with their life problems, and “deaf” to their voice.
The very low trust in political parties and representative institutions is linked to
their strong dissatisfaction with democracy, but, if this makes them particular-
ly angry and worried, it does not undermine their confidence on the impact
of their voice.
Two relevant differences can be singled out though: while in Italy the pre-
carious and the older generation share the same level of distrust, in Spain the
older generation shows if not more trust, at least less distrust than the preca -
rious generation; and, while in Spain the combination of political grievance and
dissatisfaction translated in a (temporary?) exit strategy from electoral politics,
in Italy it is (was?) still channelled by traditional but radical political parties into
the electoral arena. Without much enthusiasm, however, as the identification
with those parties remains low. 
5. PRECARIOUS GENERATION: A COLLECTIVE IDENTITY?
Alessandro Pizzorno (1966) had already noted that the characteristics of poli -
tical participation are rooted in the systems of solidarity that are at the basis
of the very definition of interest: interests can in fact be singled out only with
reference to a specific value system, and values push individuals to identify
with wider groups in society, providing a sense of belonging to them and the
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willingness to mobilize for them. In this perspective, participation is an ac -
tion in solidarity with others that aims at protecting or transforming the domi -
nant values and interest systems. The process of participation requires there-
fore the construction of solidarity communities within which individuals per-
ceive themselves and are recognized as equals. Political participation itself
aims at this identity construction: before mobilizing as a worker, an individual
has to identify herself as a worker and feel that she belongs to a working class.
Identification as awareness of being part of a collective us facilitates political par-
ticipation. As Pizzorno (1966: 109) stated long ago, in fact, the latter ‘increases
(it is more intense, clearer, more precise) when class consciousness is high’.
In this sense, it is not the ‘social centrality’ mentioned by Milbrath and Goel
(1977), but rather the centrality with respect to a class (or a group)– as linked
with the identification with that class (or group) –that defines an individual’s
propensity to political participation. And this explains why some groups,
composed of individuals that are endowed with low status, under some con-
ditions are able to mobilize more than other groups. Participation is therefore
explained not only by individual resources, but also by collective resources.
In fact, recent research has looked at the shift from individual to group
identities, and then the politicization of such identities. Research on cleavages
had indeed singled out a cultural dimension, as informed by ‘the set of values
and beliefs that provide a sense of identity and role to the empirical elements
and reflects a self-awareness of the social group(s) involved’ (Bartolini, 2000:
17, see also Bartolini and Mair, 1990). Regarding the class cleavage, Rokkan
(1999: 286) noted that ‘conflicts between owners and employers have always
contained elements of economic bargaining but they have also strong elements
of cultural opposition and ideological insulation’. Also in social movement
studies, collective identification is expected only if there is awareness of the fact
that one’s own destiny is in large part linked to material conditions, while the
lack of such awareness is defined as false consciousness (Snow and Lessor,
2013). 
Identity formation is a complex process, and it is difficult to operationalize.
As far as our data are concerned, relevant indicators included in the question-
naire are identification with other demonstrators and the organizations staging
the demonstrations, as well as various motivations, values and norms that
pushed participants into the street. This set of variables reveals strong differen -
ces in the collective identity of the precarious generation in the two countries.
The data of our research indicate that the precarious generation in Spain
identifies much more both with other participants (84% identify “quite” or
“very much” against only 56% in Italy; Cr.s V= .31, significant at .001 level)
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and the organizations staging the demonstration (70% vs. 49%, Cr. V= .22,
significant at .001 level). It is worth noticing that while in Spain the precarious
generation has the same high level of identification than the older one, in Italy
the latter shows a much higher identification: 76% vs. 56% quite or very much
identify with other participants (Cr.s V: .21, significant at .001 level), and 67%
vs. 49% with organizations (Cr. V: .18, at .001 level).
With respect to the motivations, the precarious generation in Spain seems
more motivated to participate in the selected demonstrations “to express their
view” (55% vs. 45% very much agree with this item; Cr.s V: .10, significant
at .01 level); “to press politicians” (56% against 29%; Cr.s V: .26; significant at
.001 level); and because they “feel morally obliged” (48% vs. 22%; Cr.s V: .26;
significant at .001 level); and above all “to defend their interests” (as much as
54% against only 20% in Italy; Cr.s V: .33, significant at .001 level). In Italy a
bit more declare they participate in order “to raise awareness” (61% vs. 51%;
not significant), and “to express solidarity” (49% against 45%, not significant). 
If we build and indicator of “motivation strength”, ranging from 0 (no
motivation at all) to 1 (strongly motivated)6, we notice that the mean is .51
in Spain and only .37 in Italy (ETA: .23, significant at .001 level). Moreover,
while in Spain the precarious and the older generation is characterised by the
same level of motivational strength; in Italy the older generations is instead
significantly more motivated (.47 vs. .37, ETA: .16, at .001 level). Interesting
differences refer to especially two items, which shows the different types of
collective identity of the two generations in Italy: the older generation is much
more motivated by the pressure that their protest make on politicians (56%
vs. only 29%; Cr. s V: .27, significant at .001 level); and by the need to express
solidarity (62% vs. 49%; Cr. s V: .13, significant at .001 level).
Figure 4 represents, instead, the self-location of the two precarious genera -
tions on a classical left-right scale, showing that in Spain the young demonstra-
tors declare to be much more leftist than in Italy. Again, while in Spain no diffe -
rence we found between the precarious and the older generation, in Italy the
latter places itself much more than the former on the leftist side of the scale
(about 77% vs. 59% placed either on the extreme left or in the left category; Cr.
s V: .22, at. 001 level). 
Summarizing, it seems that although basically the same kind of precarious
generation mobilized in Italy and Spain, in the latter country it appears to have
produced a more intense collective identification based on strong motivation,
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es pecially linked with its “interests” and firmly located on a leftist position. Whi -
le in Spain a strong collective identity characterises both the precarious and the
older generation, in Italy the precarious generation appears much weaker, less
cohesive and less rooted in a leftist position than the older one.
6. NETWORKS AND EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE PRECARIOUS 
GENERATION
A different set of explanations for participation looks at embeddedness in social
networks (Diani, 1992; della Porta, 2013). The main assumption is that partici -
pation in protests requires supporting networks that provide positive incen-
tives, not only in affective terms but also in cognitive ones. Networks which are
relevant for the explanation of differential political participation are those that
provide for information about protest events as well as emotional support. In line
with literature on social capital, these networks are expected to provide norms
of reciprocity and reciprocal trust that are relevant for collective action. Em -
beddedness helps overcome the free-rider phenomenon by providing a sense of
commitment as well as social control: so much so, that the single most relevant
factor in explaining participation in protests is whether or not one has been
asked to participate (Schussman and Soule, 2005). 
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Figure 4. Precarious generation self-collocation in 
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The presence of dense but informal networks distinguishes social move-
ments from other collective actors, which instead have clear organizational
boundaries. In social movements, individuals and organizations, while keeping
their autonomous identities, engage in sustained exchanges of resources orien -
ted to the pursuit of a common goal. The coordination of specific initiatives, the
regulation of individual actors’ conduct, and the definition of strategies all
depend on permanent negotiations between the individuals and the organiza-
tions involved in collective action. No single organized actor, no matter how
powerful, can claim to represent a movement as a whole. (della Porta and Diani,
2006: 21). In new social movements, a networked, loosely coordinated struc-
ture emerged as a better fit to address the various and variable needs of mobi-
lization as well as those of survival in the doldrums (Diani, 1995; Taylor and van
Dyke, 2004). The network structure allows movements to maintain a plural
repertoire, testing various potential options and combining their effects. The
capacity to form and sustain these networks is therefore a very central task in
resource mobilization: categorical traits (such as class) are not sufficient for co -
llective action; they need to be supported by dense network ties.
In a cross-national study on protest participation based on the World Values
Survey, Russell Dalton and his colleagues (Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon,
2010) noted that ‘involvement in social groups creates networks for recruit-
ment in political life’ (ibid.: 59). In fact, while grievances appear to be unrela -
ted to protest, “education and social group membership are strong and signifi -
cant predictors of protest” (ibid.: 67). Similarly, in research on immigrants’
mobilization, Klandermans, Van der Toorn and Van Stekelenburg (2008) obser -
ved that participation in associations was very highly correlated with protest,
as well as with other dimensions connected with protest, such as identification
with an ethnic group, sense of efficacy and feelings of injustice. Indeed, ‘inte-
gration into civil society –whether through ethnic or cross-ethnic networks–
as reflected in embeddedness and dual identity, reinforces action participation.
These aspects of integration create the preconditions for immigrants to turn
discontent into action’ (ibid.). Also according to Verhulst and Walgrave (2009),
a characteristic of first-timers that clearly distinguish them from frequent de -
monstrators is their weak organizational embeddedness (see also Saunders,
Grasso, Olcese, Rainsford, and Rootes, 2012). 
To operationalize network embeddedness we use three sets of variables: the
first set includes with whom respondents were protesting (if alone, with their
family, with friends or colleagues, or with other members of the organization they
belong to); the second, the most important channels of information through
which protesters knew about the demonstration (mainstream or alternative me -
dia, family, informal, work or organizational channels); the third, their member-
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ship in different types of organizations. The first set of variables has been aggre -
gated by considering a scale of network embeddedness. This means that if a
protesting individual is accompanied by personal friends and acquaintances,
she is included in more external network; if she was with colleagues, she would
be put in work networks; and if she was with other members of an organization,
she would be considered part of an organization network.
Figure 5 shows that the protesting precarious generation in Spain is more
embedded in informal networks, such as family or friends; while in Italy more
in organizational networks. At the same time, in both countries, the level of
formal embeddedness is higher in the older generation: in Italy 44% vs. 32%
de monstrated with co-members of the organization, 20% vs. 39% with friends
or acquaintances; and in Spain 37% vs. 24% with the former, and 29% vs. 42%
with the latters. 
As far as the channels of information are concerned, the most important,
and indeed interesting, difference refers to the much higher use of online alter-
native media and social networks by the precarious generation in Spain than
in Italy (Figure 6). Here too, the difference with the older generation in the
two countries are relevant: in Spain, 50% of the older generation, against 33%
of the precarious one use much more the organizational channels of informa-
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Figure 5. Network embeddedness of the precarious 
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tion, and only 22% vs. 47% online instruments; in Italy, 50% vs. 30% the former
and 15% vs. 27% the latter.
Finally, as far as the organizational membership is concerned, 25% of pre-
carious generation participants in Italy and 26% in Spain are members of one
organization staging the demonstration; as much as 38% in Spain and 30% in
Italy has no membership at all (referring to the last 12 months at the moment
of the demonstration). In both countries about 20% of the precarious genera-
tion belongs to a political party, while as much as 44% in Spain and 46% in Italy
belong to a social movement organization; the only relevant difference refers
to membership in trade unions, more widespread in Spain (37%) than in Italy
(only 20%).
What counts more, is the difference between the precarious and the older
generation within the two countries: in Spain, 51% of the older vs. 26% of the
precarious generation belongs to one organization staging the demonstration
(Cr. s V: .23, significant at .001 level), only 24% vs. 38% has no membership in
the last 12 months (.16, at .001 level), 30% vs. 20% is a political party member
(.12, at .001 level), 63% vs. 37% is member of a trade union (.29, at .001 level);
and 60% vs. 44% belongs to one social movement organization (.16, at .001
level). In Italy, 55% vs. 27% is member of a staging organization (.28, at .001
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Fig. 6. Most important channels of information of the 
precarious generation in Spain and Italy9








level), 23% vs. 33% has no membership, 25% vs. 20% is member of a party,
but as much 50% vs. 20% of a trade union, and, finally 41% vs. 46% of a social
movement organization.
To sum up, the two protesting precarious generations are embedded in
different types of networks in the two countries, mostly informal and based on
new, online, type of communication, in Spain, and more formal and based on
traditional organizational type of communication in Italy. The difference in
terms of network and membership between the older and the precarious gene -
ration is more evident in Spain than in Italy. The older generation here is much
more formally embedded and organizationally driven. While in Italy, though
the older generation is much more organizationally embedded, the precarious
generation has difficulty in building its distinct network integration. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, we singled many similarities in the ways in which the preca -
rious generations mobilized in the two countries. First of all, both countries saw
a high participation among young people. Notwithstanding the material and
symbolic constrains usually associated with a lack of a stable job (and a stable
life), young people in precarious position took the street in protest against neo -
liberalism. Antiausterity policies made the threats unbearable with the result
that also a generation that had called itself “with no future” made their voice
heard.
The precarious generation in Spain and Italy share similar socio-graphic
features, they are equilibrated in term of gender, more than the older generation,
they are more formally educated and they are prevalently student, unemployed,
and effectively “precarious” in term of job position. 
In both countries, moreover, this generation shows the type of indignation
against the political system, and the traditional political parties, which gene -
rated anger and worries, without however lowering, preventing, or questioning
a strong sense of collective efficacy. 
But the similarities stop here. 
If in both countries this generation was embedded in several networks,
those were found more personal in the horizontal social movement culture that
prevails in Spain, and more within formal movement organizations in the more
associational contentious culture we had described in Italy. Moreover, the tradi-
tional forms of the left organizations, mainly political parties and trade unions,
have been found more relevant in the older generation network integration in
both countries. But, while those are still relevant, though to a less extent, for the
younger cohort of protesters in Italy; in Spain the precarious generation seems
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more able to experiment new forms of network integration, and to exploit more
effectively internet and the social networks.
The more autonomous, thought weaker civil society in Spain, might have
left the space open for a new more radical, more cohesive and motivated co -
llective identity, while a stronger, but more heteronomous civil society in Italy
might have reduced the opportunities for a more cross-sector movement. As
already noticed in the introduction, this may account for the old trade unions
dominating antiausterity protest in Italy, which might have limited the space
for new actors and identities to emerge.
It seems that the more structured, and party-dominated, civil society in
Italy is being preventing the precarious generation to find the space to build a
new collective identity and new forms of organizations. There, young people
need to adapt to the pre-existing “bins” of the old collective identity in which
they identify less and less.
These differences can explain why the precarious generation in the two
countries differently linked their protest action to the electoral action. Even
if high level of mistrust and negative feelings towards institutional politics
prevailed, Spanish young activists were able to take electoral politics seriously,
when chances opened up at that level. Countering the expectations that the
extremely high level of mistrust and the lack of practice with elections would
reduce the chance of finding party allies, the stounding victories of movement-
related parties like Podemos and Guanyem indicates an availability towards
the use of multiple repertoires and organizational formats. The same level of
distrust, was instead electorally channelized in Italy by established often radi-
cal leftist parties, still rooted in both social movement tradition and civil socie-
ty organizations.
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